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1. Introduction
As the military phase of the U.S. war against Saddarn Hussein&apos;s Iraqi regime
was drawing to a close, public attention began to focus on a variety of post-war
efforts, including that of reactivating oil field activity in Iraqs vast petroleum re-
serves. In an article appearing in the June 2003 issue of the European Journal of
International Law, we explored the rights of a belligerent occupant to work gov-
ernment owned oil fields.&apos; Particular attention was paid to whether the rule of usu-
fruct, codified in article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations on land warfare,,2 re-
stricted a belligerent occupant&apos;s authority to employ new technologies in working
the reserves of the occupied state,3prohibited an occupant from increasing produc-
tion from those reserves,4or established parameters concerning the uses to which
the proceeds from the sale of such production could be pUt.5 Left completely aside,
however, was discussion of the relationship between the UN&apos;s oil-for-food pro-
graM,6which governed disposition of Iraqi oil from the mid-1990s forward, and
the Hague rules on belligerent occupancy. The significance of this matter was made
readily apparent by questions raised, in the wake of the military action against
Iraq, about whether a U.S.-led coalition occupying authority, or only the UN, pos-
sessed control of transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqsoil.7
* Professor of Law and Director, National Energy-Environment Law and Policy Institute, Univer-
sity of Tulsa; Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy, 1977-81 and 1996-97; JD, 1961,
Harvard Law School.
** Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and International Law Center, University of Tulsa;
Cutting Fellow in International Law, 1980-81, and J.S.D., 1987, Columbia University.
I See R. Dobie L a n g e n k a m p /Rex J. Z e d a I i s, What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on
Some Significant, Unexamined International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields,
European journal of international Law 417 fn. 1 (2003) (indicating a number of the other interesting,
but unexplored issues)(hereinafter cited as &quot;What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?&quot;).
2 For the Hague Regulations, see Regulations to Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land (IV), 18 Oct. 1907, available at &lt;wwwyale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/ha-
gue04.htm&gt; (accessed May 15, 2003).
3 See What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?, supra note I at 421-25.
4 See id. at 425-29.
5 See id. at 430-34.
6 See infra notes 14-15.
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Clearly, from the standpoint of international relations, the ultimate answer to
that question of control had indisputable importance. By some estimates, the dollar
8amount of all claims against Iraq totaled nearly (US)$ 400 billion. This included
not yet fully compensated claims arising from the 1991 Gulf War, as well as claims
from outstanding obligations for services rendered or goods supplied to the former
government of Saddam Hussein, and contractual commitments previously nego-
tiated by representatives of that government but not yet performed. At some junc-
ture, it was feared that claimants might attempt to take legal action in various for-
eign jurisdictions in order to collect on what they considered to be owed.
Some potential claimants indicated reservations about the strength of the legal
bases underpinning their own positions.9 Conversely, others were extremely confi-
dent, with suggestions that at least one claimant insisted that any U.S. or coalition
shipments of Iraqi oil leaving that country would be considered &quot;fair game&quot; for le-
gal proceedings aimed at securing debt satisfaction.10 The situation undoubtedly
accounted, in part, for the mid-April 2003 position expressed by the Bush adminis-
7 See Bruce Stanley (Associated Press), Mother of Challenges - Reviving Iraq Oil Output
Won&apos;t Be Easy, Tulsa World, Apr. 12, 2003 at El, col. 2 (noting legal title is essential in order to be
able to transfer Iraqi oil, and noting U.S. has encountered difficulties on that front). See also Chip
Cummins, Oil-Export Delay Risks Damage to Northern Wells, Reservoirs, Wall St. J., Apr. 18,
2003 at A3, col. 5 (exports of oil from Iraq held up by questions regarding who has control); Felicity
B a r r i n g e r, Billions in Aid From the U.N. Is in Limbo, Official Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2003 at
A10, col. 6 (head of U.N. Iraq Programmes Office indicates transfers of Iraqi oil now complicated by
questions of who possesses authority to make legal transfers). On the fact the UN is the proper
authority to transfer title to Iraqi oil, see (Reuters), Australian urges U.N. unity to help post-war
Iraq, 27 Mar. 2003, available at &lt;wwwalertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SYD340622.htm&gt; (accessed
Apr. 15, 2003); Statements made by M. Jacques C h i r a c, President of the Republic, during his joint
press briefing with M. Rudd Lubbers, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Apr. 8, 2003, avail-
able at &lt;http://special.diplomatic.gouvfr/article-gb293.htm&gt; (accessed Apr. 15, 2003). it should be
noted that various officials from the United States have indicated that Iraqi oil belongs to the people
of Iraq. Presumably, the intent of such statements is that during the period of U.S.-led coalition occu-
pation, Iraqs oil will be used for the benefit of Iraq. What remains unclear, however, is the extent to
which such official indications imply recognition by the United States that &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil is
vested in the state of Iraq. As belligerent occupation acknowledges the absence of any nation-wide
Iraqi controlled and overseen governing authority, the indications that Iraqs oil belongs to the Iraqi
people most likely suggests nothing more than that the benefits of such oil will be used, in one way
or another, for those who populate Iraq. It is unlikely such indications are meant to signify that &quot;legal
title&quot; to Iraqi oil is actually vested in the United States and its occupying allies.
Note: throughout this article, reference is made to United States and its occupying allies, coalition
allies, etc. In all cases, however, what is intended is reference to U.S.-led coalition as belligerent occu-
pants. It should also be noted that this article does not examine the possibility that, immediately
following Saddam Hussein&apos;s ouster from power, transferability of title to Iraqi oil was placed in &quot;sus-
pension,&quot; or &quot;abeyance&quot;.
8 See Debts of a Dictator, The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, May 6, 2003, available at
&lt;www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle-east/jan-juneO3/debt-5-6.htmi&gt; (accessed May 8, 2003).
9 Total Elf Fina president recognizes company has no legally negotiated contract, pre-contract, or
memorandum of understanding with Iraq. See Martin A r n o I d, Total Confident on Chances of Win-
ning Iraq Oil Contracts, Financial Times (May 7, 2003), available at &lt;wwwglobalpolicyorg/security/
oil/2003/0507total.htm&gt; (accessed May 30, 2003).
10 This is the position that has been taken by the Russian company Lukoil.
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tration that debt forgiveness might be integral to the world community&apos;s effort to
help Iraq move towards democratic self-rule.&quot; In any case, it was soon perfectly
clear that potential litigation associated with exports of Iraqi oil might compel con-
frontation of nettlesome questions regarding transferable &quot;legal title,&quot; questions
felt better left unconfronted. Thus, by early May, the United States began the push
for what eventually became Security Council resolution 1483. That resolution,
adopted on May 22, 2003, by a margin of 14 to 0, with Syria absent from the vote,
called, most importantly, for the dismantling of the Iraqi sanction regime and the
phasing-out of the oil-for-food program.12 Though the resolution may have effec-
tively eliminated the immediate significance of the dispute over UN versus U.S.
control of transferable title to Iraq&apos;s oil, it did nothing to help provide an answer to
who had the better argument about control during the weeks right after Saddam&apos;s
ouster. Nor did it provide an answer regarding control during the oil-for-food pro-
gram&apos;s phase-out period spanning the six months following resolution 1483&apos;s adop-
tion.
From a far broader perspective than the identity of the rightful claimant to con-
trol over &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil during the period leading-up to 1483s adoption
and eventual implementation, the differing perspectives of the UN and the U.S. on
the matter raised a more timeless and enduring problem. That specific problem
concerns the interface between UN juridical regimes articulated in Security Coun-
cil resolutions, and the rights and duties of an occupying power following the de-
feat and removal of a government at which Council resolutions have been directed.
The UN&apos;s recent involvement in Somalia, Haiti, East Timor and elsewhere has cer-
tainly presented the prospect that a pre-existing UN program implementing Secur-
ity Council resolutions could run into difficulties, were military action to result in
belligerent occupancy of a state to which a UN juridical regime was applied. In-
deed, given current tensions regarding activities by certain states to develop nuclear
weapons, one can just imagine a situation in which the Security Council constructs
a binding scheme aimed at resolving a stand-off with a particular state, only to see
subsequent unilateral military action ousting that state&apos;s government and, thus,
11 Position taken by U.S. Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz. See Alan Murray, In a
Forgiving mood, MSNBC, Apr. 11, 2003; Michael 0 d i g b e, Managing Iraq&apos;s Post-War Foreign Debt
(Apr. 2003), available at &lt;wwwecondad.org/Iraq.htm&gt; (accessed June 1, 2003).
12 As early as mid-April 2003 President Bush indicated he preferred to see the termination of the
UN sanctions on Iraq. The speculation suggested that this preference was tied to ending the oil-for-
food program and, thus eliminating the possibility of UN control over Iraqi oil. See Richard W. S t e -
v e n s o n /Felicity B a r r i n g e r, Bush Urging U.N. to Lift Sanctions Imposed on Iraq, N.Y Times,
Apr. 17, 2003 at Al, col. 6. By the middle of the second week in May it had become clear that a
formal push would be made in the Security Council for a resolution to accomplish that precise objec-
tive. See Felicity B a r r i n g e r /David L e o n h a r d t, U.S. Drafts a Resolution On the Lifting of Sanc-
tions, N.Y Times, May 8, 2003 at A14, col. 6. For the May 9, 2003, initial draft proposed by the U.S.
see Text of U.S.-supported U.N. resolution on Iraq, available at &lt;wwwusatodaycom/news/world/
iraq/2003-05-09-un-iraq-text-X.htm&gt; (accessed May 12, 2003); for the May 19, 2003, final draft see
Final US-UK-Spain Draft Resolution, UN Doc. SC/2003/556, available at &lt;wwwglobalpolicyorg/se-
curity/issues/iraq/document/2003/0519draftresol.htm&gt; (accessed May 21, 2003). For Security Council
resolution 1483, see S.C. Res. 1483, 22 May 2003, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483.
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raising the issue of whether the belligerent occupant must respect aspects of the
UN plan. By an examination of the problem involving Iraqi oil, specifically seeking
to illuminate the persuasiveness of the differing claims that concerned UN access
to transferable &quot;legal title,&quot; an ideal opportunity is provided for observations re-
garding the broader matter of the relationship between UN regimes and the law of
belligerent occupancy.
Prior to beginning, however, one would do well to keep in mind that article 55
of the Hague Regulations of 1907 generally provides adequate authority for an oc-
cupying military force to tap an occupied nation&apos;s oil resources for limited pur-
poses.13 What complicates the situation in Iraq was the adoption by the Security
Council of resolution 986, which created the oil-for-food program in 1995,14 and
its implementing 1996 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which fleshed-out
the particulars of the program and represented a Council authorized agreement
with the government of deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.1-5 More specifically,
the Security Council actions creating the oil-for-food program presented the pro-
spect of a definitive legal regime possibly capable of leaving an indelible mark on
attempts to transfer Iraqi oil even after both war and the commencement of belli-
gerent occupancy. Whether such could be persuasively argued undoubtedly turns
on three matters. The first concerns the precise wording of resolution 986 and its
implementing MOU. The second deals with the rules governing state succession to
earlier UN legal commitments. And the third, the relevant practice of nation-states
in regard to analogous situations in which military action by a member of the
world community ousts a government from territory previously subject to a juridi-
cal regime fashioned by United Nations&apos; diplomats. In the pages that follow, each
of these three matters will be taken up in turn.
11. The Terms of the UN Documents Creating the Oil-for-Food
Program
It would seem that any successful claim the UN possessed control of transfer-
able &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil, and that such remained unaffected by the belligerent
occupancy of the United States and its allies,16 would have to find its origins in
13 See generally the authorities cited in What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?, supra note 1.
14 S.C. Res. 986, UN Doc. S/RES/986,14 Apr. 1995.
15 Memorandum of understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Govern-
ment of Iraq on the implementation of Security Council resolution 986 (1995), UN Doc. S/1996/356,
20 May 1996.
16 See text of supra note 7, wherein it is suggested that statements that Iraqi oil belongs to the
people of Iraq could be susceptible to the reading that &quot;legal title&quot; is vested in the people of Iraq. It
cannot be emphasized strongly enough, though, that the probable intent of such statements extends
no further than to the idea of the benefits of Iraqi oil being used, in one way or another, for the
populace of Iraq. This would be tantamount to categorizing the Iraqi peoples interest as equitable
title.
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either Security Council resolution 986 or its implementing MOU. There is nothing
inherent in the very nature of the UN that bestows on that organization any sort of
automatic authority over natural resources of member states. Indeed, article 2(7) of
the UN Charter acknowledges the independent jurisdictional sovereignty of mem-
ber states in regard to all domestic matters,17 of which natural resources would
surely qualify. And, numerous resolutions adopted over the years by the United
Nations explicitly confirm the sovereignty of each state over its own natural re-
sources.&apos;8 Consequently, in the absence of some plain language in 986 or its corre-
sponding MOU, there would seem little basis for suggesting that control of trans-
ferable title to Iraq&apos;s oil resides in the United Nations.
With specific regard to resolution 986, it builds upon an earlier adopted flat pro-
hibition on member state imports from, exports to, or commercial or financial deal-
ings with Iraq, a prohibition declared by the Security Council immediately after
Iraq&apos;s invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990.19 In doing so, resolution 986 departs
from the prohibition and explicitly permits member states to import oil from Iraq,
so long as imports are made under the resolution-established oil-for-food pro-
grarn.20 An escrow account to receive the proceeds of such import sales is called
for,21 disbursement priorities are enunciated,22 and monitoring responsibilities are
set forth in the resolution.23 Further, 986 expressly authorizes the Secretary-Gener-
al to take the kinds of actions that eventuated in the negotiation of the resolution&apos;s
implementing MOU.24 Most importantly for present purposes, however, the lan-
guage of the resolution contains two sets of references that certainly appear to sug-
gest any UN control over transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil was not to run inde-
finitely. The third paragra-ph of the resolution&apos;s preamble represents the first set,
and it indicates the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people convinced the Security
Council of the need for the oil-for-food program as a &quot;temporary measure,&quot; pend-
ing Iraq&apos;s full compliance with other Council resolutions.25 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of
resolution 986&apos;s substantive provisions represent the second set, and they leave no
doubt that the permission to import oil from Iraq pursuant to the oil-for-food pro-
gram lasts for a renewable fixed-term period. Paragraph 3 provides the permission
.shall remain in force for an initial period of 180 days unless the Council takes
other relevant action&quot;,26 and paragraph 4 that the Council &quot;expresses its intention
17 See UN Charter, art. 2, para. 7.
18 See e.g., Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963); Resolution on Permanent Sover-
eignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28,h Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1974).
19 See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661, 6 Aug. 1990.
20 See S.C. Res. 986, supra note 14 at para. 1.
21 See id. at para. 7.
22 See id. at para. 8.
23 See id. at paras. I (a), 4, 6, 11-12.
24 See id. at para. 13.
25 See S.C. Res. 986, supra note 14 at third para. of Preamble.
26 See id. at para. 3.
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to consider favourably renewal of the provisions of [the] resolution&quot;.27 As is
well known, the oil-for-food program received regular renewal, expiring in mid-
June of 2003.
The language from both the third paragraph of the Preamble, and paragraph&apos;s 3
and 4 of the resolution&apos;s substantive provisions, may suggest that UN bases for
control over transferable title to Iraqi oil rest on a less than ideal foundation. Inter-
estingly, such an interpretation of the technical terminology of these provisions is
consonant with the more impressionistic view that the trade embargo on Iraq and
the various other UN measures directed at that nation were precipitated by the fact
of Saddam Hussein&apos;s stranglehold on the reigns of governmental power. And, with
his removal by the United States and its allies, the entire web of Security Council
resolutions centred on Iraq, including the resolution creating the oil-for-food pro-
gram, witnessed a concomitant removal of supporting foundational rationale. Ac-
cordingly, with Saddam and his cronies gone, all previously relevant Council reso-
lutions were at an end as well. In spite of both the simplistic attractiveness of this
interpretation and the textual support in the Preamble of resolution 986 and sub-
stantive paragraphs 3 and 4, one cannot ignore the background context and specific
terminology of other Security Council resolutions concerning the Iraqi situation.
As alluded to previously, resolution 986 was designed to permit member states
to import oil from Iraq, as long as in accordance with the dictates of the oil-for-
food program. This permission constituted a specific exception from the more
overarching prohibition on trade or financial dealings with Iraq articulated in Se-
curity Council resolution 661, adopted on the heels of Saddam Hussein&apos;s aggres-
28
sion against neighboring Kuwait. Following Security Council issuance in early
April of 1991 of resolution 687, setting out, among other things, the long disputed
29
weapons inspection obligations of Iraq, the removal of 661&apos;s basic prohibition
was made contingent on Iraq&apos;s fulfillment of its weapons obligations. Paragraph 22
of resolution 687 makes that crystal clear. The language of the paragraph states the
decision that &quot;upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contem-
plated [under its weapons obligations], the prohibitions against the import of com-
modities and products originating in Iraq contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall
have no further force or effect&quot;.30 The totality of provisions from relevant resolu-
tions thus suggest a prohibition, outside the confines of the oil-for-food program,
on all Iraqi oil trade, until the Security Council acknowledged Iraqi compliance
with weapons obligations. And given the idea that oil-for-food required periodic
renewal, in the event permitted exceptional oil trade failed to receive Council re-
authorization, the basic embargo of 661 was to reactivate.
Paragraph 14 of resolution 986 contains additional language that provides even
further illumination on such a technical interpretation of relevant texts, and on the
27 See id. at para. 4.
28 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29 See S.C. Res. 687, paras. 8-13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687, 3 Apr. 1991.
30 See id. at para. 22.
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international community&apos;s controversy regarding control over transferable &quot;legal
title&quot; to Iraq&apos;s oil. That provision quite plainly indicates that &quot;petroleum and petro-
leum products subject to [the oil-for-food] resolution shall while under Iraqi title
be immune from legal proceedings and not be subject to any form of attachment or
execution&quot;.31 It then requires all member states take whatever steps are necessary
32
to assure such protection under their own domestic legal systems. Admittedly,
varying constructions of the phrase &quot;while under Iraqi title&quot; may be proffered. But
would it be so completely without merit to suggest that the phrase could be read as
recognition by the Security Council that, despite the establishment of the oil-for-
food program, title to Iraq&apos;s oil remained with the Iraqis until, under UN auspices,
it was sold to someone else, and the Council simply wanted to assure that the pro-
gram&apos;s humanitarian objectives were not frustrated by outsiders making claims
against Iraq&apos;s oil? Accepting such a reading, and conjoining it with the notion that,
in the absence of the oil-for-food program, a prohibition exists on trade in Iraqi oil,
the following implication would seem to arise. Specifically, Iraq has title to its own
oil; resolutions 661 and 687 essentially forbid member states from importing such
until Iraq complies with its UN imposed weapons obligations; the only exception
concerning importation emerges from resolution 986&apos;s renewable oil-for-food pro-
gram; UN authorized transfers made under that program are immune from exter-
nal legal claims; and, in the event a lapse in the oil-for-food program, all transfers
are to cease, unless and until the Security Council acts to remove resolution 661&apos;s
embargo.
What about the terms of resolution 986&apos;s implementing MOU?33 Do they pro-
vide corroboration for reading the operative Security Council documents as in-
tending to recognize UN continuing control over transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi
oil? Or, conversely, does a rigorous textual analysis of the terms of the MOU sup-
port the non-technical, impressionistic view that with Saddam gone, the program-
matic regimes set forth in all relevant resolutions came to an end? Clearly, accept-
ing the former reading would open the door for the insistence that, following the
U.S. military action against Iraq, control over transferable title to Iraqi oil remained
in the United Nations. The latter reading, on the other hand, would provide sup-
port for the notion that such control devolved to the United States as the occupy-
ing belligerent authority.
As a whole, the implementing MOU sought to provide particular details regard-
ing several aspects of the oil-for-food program. A distribution plan was set forth to
assure equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies within Iraq.34 The specifics
of the oil-for-food program&apos;s escrow account,35 and the contractual procedures by
which sales of Iraqi oil were to take place,36 received substantial attention. Procure-
31 See S.C. Res. 986, supra note 14 at para. 14.
32 See id.
33 See MOU, supra note 15.
34 See id. at Sec. 11, paras. 5-11.
35 See id. at Sec. III, paras. 12-15.
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ment monitoring37 and oversight mechanisms for the distribution of humanitarian
supplies311 were also treated at length. But with regard to whether UN control over
transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqs oil was envisioned as running indefinitely into the
future, the MOU contains a couple of references worth noting. These appear in
paragraphs 4 and 50 of the Memorandum itself,39 and paragraph 1 of Annex 11,40
which is made a part of the MOU by virtue of language indicating that the provi-
sions of that Annex &quot;constitute an integral part of [the] Memorandum&quot;.41
In point of fact, both paragraph 4 and paragraph 50 of the MOU bear a striking
resemblance to the third paragraph of resolution 986&apos;s Preamble, and paragraphs 3
and 4 of the resolution&apos;s substantive provisions. Paragraph 4 of the MOU provides
that it is clearly understood by both the UN and the government of Iraq that the
negotiated regime established by the Memorandum is &quot;exceptional and tempor-
&quot; 42
ary This closely tracks the sentiment expressed in the third paragraph of resolu
tion 986&apos;s Preamble. Paragraph 50 of the MOU, in line with paragraphs 3 and 4 of
986&apos;s substantive provisions, explicitly declares that the regime the Memorandum
establishes &quot;shall remain in force until the expiration of the 180 day period referred
to in paragraph 3 of the Resolution&quot; itself.43 Essentially, the language from these
two paragraphs of the MOU leave little question that the Memorandum&apos;s regime
was not to last indefinitely.
Then there is paragraph 6 of the MOU&apos;s Annex II. That Annex sets forth some
of the particulars regarding contractual arrangements to purchase and pay for Iraqi
oil, and it provides for oil export monitoring arrangements.44 In addressing the ap-
proval process for contracts to purchase Iraqi oil, the Annex clearly indicates pur-
chase contracts and associated documents are to be endorsed by the government of
Iraq or the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization (hereinafter SOMO).45 In a
way, such language is consistent with resolution 986&apos;s paragraph 14, which, as al-
luded to above, recognizes Iraqs title in its oil.46 Paragraph 6 of Annex II then em-
ploys language that could be read as indicating an intent of the drafters to extend
UN control over transferable legal title for as long as possible. The language pro-
vides that the UN Secretariat and SOMO &quot;shall maintain continuing contact&quot; to
review market conditions and oil sales.47 However, it seems likely that the notion
of maintaining continuing contact expressed in paragraph 6 was simply aimed at
assuring the cooperative free-flow of information, not at manifesting a desire that
36 See id. at Sec. IV, paras. 16-18.
37 See id. at Sec. V, paras. 19-31.
38 See id. at Sec. VI, paras. 32-33, and Sec. VII, paras. 34-44.
39 See id. at Sec. L para. 4, and Sec. X, para. 50.
40 See id. at Annex 11, para. 1.
41 See MOU, supra note 15 at Sec. IV, para. 18.
42 See id. at Sec. 1, para. 4.
43 See id. at Sec. X, para. 50.
44 See id. at Annex 11, paras. 1-5.
45 See id. at Annex II, para. 1.
46 See text accompanying supra note 31.
47 See Annex II, para. 6.
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UN control over transfers was to continue indefinitely. Nevertheless, at least two
other reasons exist for believing the MOU contemplates some sort of continuing
UN control over transfers of &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqs oil.
The first reason draws on a basic point presented earlier in connection with reso-
lution 986s overall relationship to other Security Council Iraq resolutions, and
especially resolutions 661 and 687.48 Specifically, in the absence of the oil-for-food
program, the UN unequivocally signified that trade with Iraq was absolutely pro-
hibited, even trade involving Iraqi oil. Up until the end of May 2003 adoption by
the Security Council of resolution 1483,49 removal of the prohibition was condi-
tioned on certification of Iraqi compliance with its weapons obligations. Thus, in
the event of discontinuation of the permissive and limited trade regime under the
oil-for-food program, the UN&apos;s total embargo reactivated, evidencing that control
of a somewhat enduring nature had been vested in the United Nations. The open-
ing paragraph of the MOU explicitly recognizes that its generative authority is
grounded in resolution 986.50 As a consequence, would it not seem reasonable to
suggest that the collapse of the oil-for-food program, as fleshed-out in the MOU
between the Security Council and Iraq, would merely mean continuing UN
authority over transferable title through the embargo regime of the other relevant
Council resolutions?
The second reason for believing the MOU contemplates continuing UN control,
has to do with what the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 1483 sug-
gests about the meaning and intent of the MOU, and of resolution 986 which it
implements. Referenced here is the fact that, by taking pains to phase out trade
sanctions on Iraq,51 and further pains to authorize U.S. and allied occupants to sell
Iraqi OiJ52 and participate in managing the proceeds of such,53 resolution 1483 ac-
knowledges that, without its adoption, UN control was probably undeniable. After
all, if the temporary nature of the UN&apos;s control over Iraqi oil, and the framework
of Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, were brought to an end by Saddam
Hussein&apos;s removal from power, there would have been no need for such a new re-
solution. The adoption of such resolution signifies recognition that the successful
military action against Baghdad did not remove doubt about UN control over Iraqi
oil sales. Only through a new Security Council resolution could doubt of that sort
be once-and-for-all laid to rest.54
48 See text accompanying supra notes 28-33.
49 See text accompanying supra note 12.
50 See MOU, supra note 15 at Sec. 1, para. 1.
51 See supra note 12 at paras. 10, 16, and 18-19.
52 See id. at para. 20.
53 See id. at para. thirteen of the Preamble, and substantive paras. 4, 8, 12-14, and 17.
54 Admittedly, it is also possible to read 1483s language on the ending of sanctions, and U.S. and
allied authority to sell Iraqi oil, as &quot;recognition&quot; of an antedating legal reality. What cuts against that
kind of interpretation of the resolution, however, is the fact it appears inconsistent with the contex-
tual background drawn from all the other Iraqi resolutions, background that, as we have seen, sug-
gests any collapse of the oil-for-food program reactivates resolution 661&apos;s basic embargo regime. To a
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III. Succession of States to UN Commitments and Other
Important Considerations
Despite the fact the relevant UN documents concerning Iraqi oil seem best inter-
preted as having envisioned control of the transfer of that oil as under the authority
of the United Nations, what if the language of those documents failed to speak to
that matter in any clear way? Would international law in general offer any assis-
tance on whether or not a belligerent occupant succeeds to international commit-
ments of an occupied state? And, would it matter that the commitments concerning
which succession was an issue were based on Security Council resolutions and
agreements, that is to say, legal documents endorsed by an international organiza-
tion, rather than typical international treaties or conventions entered into by sover-
eign and autonomous nation-states?
The principal codification of international rules governing state succession to in-
ternational commitments is the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of TreatieS55. Obviously, one of the central hurdles in looking to that in-
strument for guidance on the question of the UN&apos;s Security Council regime surviv-
ing the belligerent occupancy of Iraq concerns the ability to view the relevant
Council documents as tantamount to international treaties. The Vienna Conven-
tion, by its very title, deals only with succession to those international instruments
known as treaties. Therefore, in the absence of the relevant Security Council docu-
ments being understood as the equivalent of &quot;treaties&quot;, the rules of the Convention
would have no direct applicability.
In connection with that matter, the precise status of UN actions in the form of
56Security Council resolutions is interesting and complex. Although the UN has
been deemed to be an &quot;international person&quot;,57 with attendant rights and responsi-
bilities, it quite correctly has not been seen as a &quot;state&quot;. Regarding that latter reality,
the UN&apos;s power to enter into contracts is seen as absent. This proceeds from the
fact that, since the international organization is not a state, there is a complete lack
of a governing municipal law system capable of recognizing, validating, and regu-
lating UN authority to make contracts. Therefore, in the event the UN desires to
seek binding commitments with others, it is of necessity required to act by &quot;treaty&quot;
under the umbrella of international laW.58
certain extent, suggestions from some UN member-states during the days and weeks immediately
following the ouster of Saddam that JAEA and UNMOVIC weapons inspectors return to Iraq, have
relevancy here. States voicing those suggestions must have been acutely aware of the public dialogue
regarding eventual exports of Iraqi oil. They also must have been aware that, taken together, resolu-
tions 661 and 687 prohibited exports, outside the context of the oil-for-food program, until the IAEA
and UNMOVIC had certified Iraq to be free of banned weapons.
55 Available at &lt;www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/tresufra.htm&gt; (accessed June 10, 2003).
56 See Clive P a r r y, The Treaty Making Power of the United Nations, 26 Brit. Yb. Int&apos;l L. 108
(1949).
57 See id. at 109.
58 See id. at 116.
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The treaty making power of the UN can be derived from four UN Charter pro-
visions. Article 43 is specifically applicable to the Security Council, and it empow-
ers the Security Council to make agreements with member countries for armed
forces and assistance to maintain international peace and security.59 Given the nat-
ure of the United Nations itself, any exercise of the authority of this Charter provi-
sion can be viewed as an act of either an international &quot;quasi-person,&quot;60 or as a de-
vice by which a number of states collaborate and act in a collective or corporate,
rather than individual, capacity. Article 24(l) seems to support the concept of col-
lective or corporate action by stating that the members &quot;agree that in carrying out
61its duties the Security Council acts in their behalf&apos;. Conceivably, the Security
Council&apos;s MOU with Iraq, which implements resolution 986, falls within these
authorities, especially since the individual member states could have so acted on
their own, and the Council&apos;s action seems at least tangentially connected to the
maintenance of international peace and security. Articles 63 and 105 of the Charter
also imply that the UN possesses the capacity to make treaty-like commitments,
but these concern the General Assembly and the trusteeship authorities of the Uni-
ted Nations, not the power of the Security Council.
Clearly, in light of the obligatory character of Security Council resolutions un-
der article 25 of the Charter, whether or not resolutions are formally designated &quot;
treaties&quot; may seem a bit like arguing whether the Odyssey was written by Homer
or another blind Greek author of the same name. In either event, the expressed in-
tent and legal force of Council resolutions is all that matters. Whether binding on
member states because they comprise part of the corpus of general international
law, or because they represent treaties to which successor states succeed, the effect
is identical. But with respect to the ability to argue that the 1978 Vienna Conven-
tion on Succession of States obligates belligerent occupants to honor pre-existing
Security Council regimes, like the oil-for-food regime, in the absence of being able
to demonstrate that resolutions are regarded as &quot;treaties&quot;, one would face a difficult
task. With regard to the oil-for-food program, however, the fact Security Council
resolution 986 was supplemented with a binding MOU seems to more favorably
position the situation. The MOU represents a treaty between the Council and the
government of Iraq. And, to that extent, the MOU and implemented Security
Council resolution provides a regime upon which the Vienna Convention would
seem provisionally capable of operating.
Yet having established that the Security Council&apos;s MOU with Iraq could fall
within the scope of treaties contemplated by the terms of the Vienna Convention,
it must be acknowledged that other potential problems exist that could prevent the
Convention&apos;s application. In particular, there is the problem of succession to trea-
59 See UN Charter, art. 43.
60 See Parry, supra note 56 at 119 (this is the term used by Parry). See also Research in Inter-
national Law Under Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties
with Comment 29 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. (Supp.) 686 (1935), art. 1 (a).
61 See UN Charter, art. 24, para. I (emphasis added).
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ties in the context of belligerent occupation. The Convention is designed to address
a variety of succession situations ranging from newly independent states, to re-
drawing of borders, to political divisions resulting in multiple sovereign units. The
matter of belligerent occupation is an entirely different sort of situation. Does the
collapse of Saddam Hussein&apos;s Iraqi regime and its replacement by American and
coalition occupying forces fail to constitute an event which, under the law of state
succession, the continuation of UN control over Iraqi oil under the oil-for-food
program is assured? No foreign sovereign is permanently placed in control of the
territory occupied. Belligerent occupancy is temporary in nature and involves little
more than administrative authority. Thus, the concept of belligerent occupancy as
set forth in the Hague and Geneva provisions on armed conflict accepts that the
law of the occupied country survives occupation, except to the extent it must be
superseded or suspended in the interest of safety and security of the occupying
forces, or in the interest of some larger occupation purpose.62
Given that an occupying power is only provisionally and temporarily in admin-
istrative control of occupied territory, sovereignty, if it can said to exist in any form
in the belligerent occupant, is de facto, not de jure. The Hague and Geneva rules on
armed conflict both contemplate occupation being temporary, if not brief.63 Belli-
gerent occupation is not regarded as conquest. It is a provisional condition that
does not involve the transfer of full sovereignty, as conquest doeS.64 And since the
belligerent occupant is not exercising sovereignty, it would not seem to be a succes-
sor state. Without the presence of a successor state, ipso facto the law of state suc-
cession would not be applicable. Article 2(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention defines
succession of states as &quot;the replacement of o n e S t a t e b y a n o t h e r in the re-
sponsibility of international relations for the territory&quot;.65 At no point does the
Convention speak of a mere occupant as succeeding to the international agreements
of an ousted state. Repeatedly, it references successor states inheriting the agree-
ments of their predecessors. In the absence of the transfer or assumption of govern-
mental power that would render the beneficiary a full sovereign, the fundamental
sine qua non of the law of state succession would be missing.
Then there is the further problem of the language of article 3 of the Vienna Con-
vention. That language clearly suggests that the Convention&apos;s codification of the
law of state succession was quite specifically not meant to apply to international
agreements between states and international organizations. The article provides in
relevant part that &quot;the present Convention d o e s n o t a p p I y to the effects of a
succession of States in respect of international agreements concluded between
62 See U.S. Dept of the Army, Laws of Law Warfare, paras. 400 and 402 (FM 27-10)(1956). The
occupant does not have the right of sale of non-military real property, but does have usufructuary
rights, including the right to use public buildings and sell timber and mineral products.
63 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 Aug.
1949) art. 6 provides &quot;the application of the present convention shall cease one year after the close of
military operations
64 See U.S. Dep&apos;t of the Army, Laws of Land Warfare, para. 353 (FM 27-10)(1956).
65 See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 2 (1)(b).
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States and other subjects of international law ...&quot;.66 The UN is an acknowledged
subject of international law that possesses a character other than that of a state.
Thus, given the Convention&apos;s directive as set forth in this particular article, it
would appear little doubt should exist regarding the fact of the inapplicability of
the Convention&apos;s rules on state succession in the context of the Iraqi oil-for-food
program.
There is also the additional problem of article 40 of the Vienna Convention. The
language of that provision complicates the certainty of whether the Convention&apos;s
rules on state succession do or do not govern situations involving belligerent occu-
pation. Article 40 provides that &quot;[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall
not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from the military
&quot; 67occupation of a territory Surely it would not seem totally unreasonable for one
to contend the choice of such phraseology supplies a colorable basis for arguing
that the Convention has left open the possibility of treaty commitments surviving
belligerent occupation. However, it is certainly one thing suggest article 40 leaves
that possibility open, and something entirely different to suggest that means the
occupying power succeeds to those treaty commitments. To indicate the provisions
of the Convention &quot;shall not prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a
treaty&quot; when military occupation is involved, may be read as simply signifying that
the occupation could leave the treaty in place for whatever governing body as-
sumes authority following the conclusion of the occupation itself. What exactly is
it that is contained in the wording of article 40 that compels it to be read as signify-
ing the occupying power takes on the treaty commitments of the government that
has been displaced from authority? At best, the wording does little more than leave
open the possibility that such commitments might be left unaffected by military
occupation.
Despite the various foregoing problems, it could be argued that the basic ratio-
nale underlying the law of state succession might seem to make the particulars of
the Vienna Convention&apos;s rules applicable during belligerent occupancy. After all,
such occupancy involves control, albeit temporary or limited, over foreign terri-
tory formerly under the control of another governmental structure. In view of this,
would it not make sense to see the operation of relevant treaties merely suspended
rather than abrogated? And, would such an approach not prove consistent with
one of the viable interpretations of article 40? Is it not possible to envision a tem-
porary occupation followed by a full reinstatement of the status quo ante? In such
a circumstance, occupation would merely provide a hiatus in the operation of a
previously established governmental regime, and a hiatus in the applicability of var-
ious treaties and international commitments. In the case of Iraq today, however, it
is clear that the occupation is not temporary in that sense, and no reinstatement of
the status quo ante is at all likely or desirable. Thus, even though it might be possi-
ble, as a theoretical matter, to accept the applicability of the concepts of state suc-
66 Id. at art. 3.
67 Id. at art. 40.
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cession in situations involving belligerent occupancy, and thereby permit the survi-
val of treaty commitments so as to bind the government replacing an occupying
power, where that government does not involve a restoration of what had existed
before, it would seem inappropriate to follow such an approach.
Aside from the difficulties associated with law of state succession applying to
belligerent occupation, the doctrines of changed circumstances and impossibility of
performance would seem to be two other important considerations that could bear
on the question of whether UN control over transferable title to Iraqi oil survived
the U.S. military occupation of that nation. Both doctrines assume the continued
existence of the two parties that originally entered into the relevant international
commitment. Neither doctrine assumes that one party has ceased to exist. Review
of articles 61 and 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pertaining to
impossibility and changed circumstances respectively do not contemplate the disin-
tegration or dissolution of one of the two parties to a treaty, and substitution with
a temporary, de facto, quasi-sovereign administrator. It could, of course, be sug-
gested that the occupying American and allied forces are exercising the full power
and authority of the defeated government on a temporary and fiduciary basis until
a permanent peace treaty or final settlement arrangement can be obtained.
Codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the doc-
trine of changed circumstances provides that a treaty commitment may not be ter-
minated unless the circumstances that have changed were unforeseen by the parties,
&quot;the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties and the effect of the change is &quot;radically to transform the extent
of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty&quot;.68 In a general sense, it
could be argued that the changed circumstances incident to Iraq being under the
authority of the occupying coalition powers would seem to meet this test. At the
time of occupation, Saddam Hussein&apos;s government had dissolved, and thus there
were no official instrumentalities of the former Iraqi regime left to perform the var-
ious duties under the oil-for-food program. Furthermore the fundamental purpose
of the program, the &quot;essential basis of the consent of the parties&quot;, had disappeared.
Iraqi oil revenues would no longer be diverted to weapons activities, and the people
of Iraq would at least have access to needed food and medicine. Conversely, how-
ever, it could be suggested that the change in circumstances that occurred did not
.radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed The
obligations were to conduct Iraqi oil sales under the terms and conditions of the
oil-for-food program, and then adhere to the mechanisms assuring that the United
Nations controlled the application of those revenues so as to provide for the essen-
tial needs of the Iraqi people. Even after the commencement of coalition occupa-
tion, these obligations remained in place, and the intent of the Security Council in
that respect clearly emerged from the background context associated with the
adoption of resolution 1483.69
68 See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, Art. 62 (1) (a) and (b).
69 See text accompanying supra Sec. H.
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The doctrine of impossibility, under article 61, finds itself in a similar situation.
The article provides for invoking the doctrine &quot;if the impossibility results from the
permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execu-
tion of the treaty&quot;. Obviously, following the commencement of occupation, no Ir-
aqi government operatives existed to serve as contacts with the UN under the oil-
for-food program. Nor were there any Iraqi agencies to make the decisions regard-
ing the sale procedures and prices of the Iraqi oil. Thus, it could be suggested that
the program envisioned by the earlier UN-Iraq MOU, and resolution 986 which it
implemented, became impossible to perform. On the other hand, though, only the
continued existence of Iraqi oil proves an &quot;object indispensable&quot; for the MOU&apos;s
execution. And in spite of the operations associated with occupying Iraq, that oil
remains in-place and available for sale. Administrative organs, like SOMO, can ea-
sily be reconstituted or replaced by comparable organs established by the occupy-
ing powers. The fact that their existence or operation is affected by the ouster of
the supporting regime does not produce the &quot;permanent disappearance or destruc-
tion&quot; of the very thing that is essential for the execution of the oil-for-food pro-
gram.
Why then did the occupying coalition return to the UN to seek the passage of
Security Council resolution 1483? The answer seems to lie in simple commercial
reality: the vulnerability of occupant-produced and sold Iraqi oil to international
litigation. Even if court adjudication of an attachment of a tanker of Iraqi oil for a
pre-existing debt or some other claim were ultimately settled in favor of the occu-
pying powers, a great deal of time, energy, and money would, of necessity, be ex-
pended. Some jurisdictions might prove unreliable or hostile in litigating the con-
troversial question of UN or U.S. control over transferable title. The certainty of
numerous claims by Iraq&apos;s many substantial creditors would render disposition of
that nation&apos;s crude oil difficult, if not impossible, without dollar for dollar guaran-
tees. In short, once Iraqi oil was placed on the high seas, it would be vulnerable to
the many uncertainties of international judicial proceedings. Clearly, the desire to
eliminate or minimize such proved the driving force behind the coalition powers&apos;
effort to secure what finally became resolution 1483.
IV. UN Practice and Belligerent Occupant Inheritance of
Commitments Deriving From UN Imposed juridical
Regimes
What does state practice show with regard to whether obligations established by
international organizations survive the onset of de jure or de facto belligerent occu-
pation? Does it support the proposition that an occupying power is bound to ob-
serve antedating international legal regimes that had been applicable to a certain
territory prior to the commencement of such occupation? Or, conversely, does it
suggest that antedating regimes have generally been viewed as ending with the in-
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itiation of belligerent occupation? In either case, to what extent has language used
in the legal instruments creating the regime seemed pivotal in regard to the matter
of regime survival? Has it appeared that, in the absence of language suggesting
duration of an indefinite nature, the regime has been seen as at an end? Or has it
seemed that a legal regime, once established and made applicable to a territory un-
der the control of a particular government, remains applicable in spite of the tar-
geted government&apos;s removal by military forces of another nation?
The Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor situations were referenced in the opening
paragraphs of this essay. However, given that all three involved the introduction of
outside military forces operating under the auspices of the United Nations, the
1974 Turkish invasion of the island of Cyprus, and the 2001 Afghanistan action by
U.S. and allied military forces, seem perhaps more directly relevant to the Iraq si-
tuation. In contradistinction to Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor, both of the latter
two situations, just as in Iraq, involved a pre-existing international legal regime es-
tablished by the United Nations, with subsequent external military action placing
territory affected by the regime under the control of either a de jure or a de facto
occupying power. On the island of Cyprus, the subsequent external military action
resulted in substantial numbers of Turkish forces remaining on the island to this
very day, occupying what is essentially 40 % of the island&apos;s northern portion. In
Afghanistan, however, the situation has been somewhat distinct. While American
and coalition military units remain in that country, force structures have decreased,
with mop-up operations and security assistance provided to Afghanistan&apos;s new in-
ternationally supported government serving as the main objectives.
Cyprus. With greater specificity to the continuing presence of Turkish military
forces in Cyprus, one would do well to recall that hostilities between the majority
Greek-Cypriot and minority Turkish-Cypriot inhabitants proved a complication
for the island&apos;s British overseers for a number of years following the Second World
70
ar. In 1960, however, London was able to mastermind a negotiated compromiseW
between itself, Greece, Turkey, and the two antagonistic ethnic communities on the
island. The compromise produced a new constitution for the Republic of Cyprus,
and treaties between the negotiating nations. The treaties were signed on 16 August
1960 in Nicosia, Cyprus, and guaranteed the island&apos;s independence and assured
both non-interference by Greece or Turkey as well as recognition of the Cypriot
constitution.71 By late 1963 and early 1964, it had become clear to the UN Security
Council that the resumption of ethnic hostilities between inhabitants of the island
threatened to bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation with one another.72 On
4 March 1964 the Council thus adopted resolution 186,73 which did several things
70 See Cyprus: Two Nations in One Island, Bow Educational Briefing No. 5, Pt. 1, available at
&lt;http://faculty.menlo.edu:8080/-jhiggins/tcvoices/bowpartl.html&gt; (accessed May 29, 2003).
71 See id. and Bow Educational Briefing No. 5, Pt. II.
72 See Repertorie Practice of the Security Council, 1964-65 at 108-111, available at &lt;wwwun.org/
Depts/dpa/repertorie/64-65-08.pdf&gt; (accessed May 28, 2003).
73 See S.C. Res. 186, UN Doc. SC/RES/1 86, 4 Mar. 1964.
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of significance. These included calling on member states (e.g., Greece and Turkey,
in particular) to refrain from actions likely to worsen the situation,74 urging the
government of Cyprus to take measures to stop bloodshed,75 and creating the Uni-
ted Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to assist in the preven-
tion of fighting. 76 Of the various provisions of the resolution, especially important
was the reference in the second paragraph of the preamble. That paragraph pro-
vided that the Council&apos;s listing of measures, such as UNFICYP&apos;s creation, and the
call for avoidance of bloodshed and actions that might worsen the situation, was
made in full &quot;[c]onsider[ation] [of] the positions taken by the parties in relation to
&quot; 77the treaties signed in Nicosia on 16 August 1960 Essentially, the preambular
statement suggests Security Council recognition that the concerned parties had
settled upon a completed plan designed to resolve long-standing differences, and
that the situation on the island brought about in March of 1964 by the government
of Cyprus was clearly at variance with that plan.
What makes such an understanding of the preambular statement in the second
paragraph all the more convincing is the language in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolu-
tion 186&apos;s substantive provisions. Both of these paragraphs are directed at Cypriots,
with the former requesting the Greek-Cypriot controlling government of the is-
land &quot;take a I I additional measures&quot; to dampen the violence, 78and the latter calling
79
on the ethnic communities and their leaders to &quot;act with the utmost restraint&quot;. In
the context of the second paragraph of the preamble, these two substantive para-
graphs would suggest nothing be done to undermine the previously negotiated
1960 compromise solution. Measures by the Greek-Cypriot government frustrat-
ing the objectives of the Republic&apos;s 1960 constitution, would appear to contravene
both paragraphs 2 and 3. Such measures represented a refusal to take &quot;all&quot; the addi-
tional steps to break the cycle of violence, as required by paragraph 2, and demon-
strated a further refusal to &quot;act with the utmost restraint&quot;, as required by paragraph
3. Both paragraphs from the resolution&apos;s substantive provisions were inextricably
bound to the Security Council&apos;s full &quot;[c]onsider[ation]&quot; of the positions taken by
Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the two ethnic communities on Cyprus, in their sign-
ing of the 1960 Nicosia treaties.
From 1964 until July of 1974, the Security Council adopted various additional
resolutions and statements addressing the situation in Cyprus.80 By-and-large,
these either extended UNFICYPs operational mandate,81 or spoke to especially
74 See id. at para. 1.
75 See id. at para. 2 and 3.
76 See id. at para. 4 and 5.
77 See id. at second para. of Preamble.
78 See id. at para. 2.
79 See id. at para. 3.
80 For a survey of the resolutions, and debates thereon, see Repertorie Practice of the Security
Council, 1966-68 at 105-113, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/66-68-08.pdf&gt; (accessed
May 28, 2003); id., 1969-71 at 121-126, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/69-71-08.pdf&gt;
(accessed May 28, 2003); id., 1972-74 at 144-159, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/72-
74-08.pdf&gt; (accessed May 28, 2003).
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significant episodes in the ethnic hostilities on the island.82 Resolution 207 deserves
particular mention, as it diverges somewhat from this pattern. The Security Coun-
cil adopted the resolution on August 10, 1965, in response to actions of the control-
ling Greek-Cypriot government that were generally seen as inconsistent with the
earlier 1960 compromise.83 During the Security Council&apos;s deliberations on the two
brief substantive provisions of the resolution, several Council members explicitly
criticized the Greek-Cypriot government for contravening the terms of resolution
186 through measures taken by that government in violation of the Cypriot consti-
tution.84 Presumably, in the estimation of these Council members, it was such con-
travening action that necessitated resolution 207&apos;s adoption. When these criticisms
are conjoined with the fact the resolution left absolutely no doubt the terms of re-
solution 186 were being reaffirmed, the reality that the 1960 negotiated compro-
mise solution was envisioned by the Security Council as surviving efforts to undo
it seems beyond serious challenge.
This same impression emerges from resolution 244 of December 22, 1968, and
continues through the adoption of resolution 353, unanimously agreed upon by the
Security Council contemporaneously with Turkey&apos;s sending of occupying military
forces to the island of Cyprus. Paragraph 5 of resolution 244 explicitly urges the
parties to undertake determined efforts &quot;with a view to keeping the peace and
arriving at a permanent settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution
186 ...&quot;.85 The second preambular paragraph of resolution 353 expresses the Coun-
cil&apos;s concern about the need for restoring the constitutional structure of Cyprus
11 established and guaranteed by international agreements&quot;, undoubtedly those of
1960, and the third paragraph indicates the Coi recollection of &apos;41ts resolution
186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 ...&quot;.86 However, what appears to be a monumental and
radical shift in the Security Council&apos;s approach on the survival of the pre-existing
1960 legal regime begins to unfold within 5 months of Turkey&apos;s July 1974 introduc-
tion of military forces.
On December 13, 1974, the Security Council adopted resolution 365, by a con-
sensus vote.87 Apparently, frustrations over the long, unsuccessful efforts to imple-
ment the 1960 solution, as well as the bifurcation of Cyprus effected through the
81 Originally, UNFICYP had a three month renewal mandate. See S.C. Res. 186, supra note 58 at
para. 6. That mandate was later lengthened to six months. See S.C. Res. 206, para. 5, UN Doc. S/
RES/206, 15 June 1965.
82 See e.g., S.C. Res. 193, UN Doc. S/RES/193, 9 Aug. 1964 (Turkish aerial attacks); Appeal by
President of the Security Council, 5 Nov. 1965, cited in Repertorie Practice of the Security Council,
1964-65 at 125-126, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorie/64-65-08.pdf&gt; (accessed May 28,
2003) (Greek-Cypriot cleansing actions against Turkish-Cypriot coastal town of Famagusta).
83 See S.C. Res. 207, UN Doc. S/RES/207, 10 Aug. 1965. See Repertorie Practice of the Security
Council, 1964-65 at 125, available at &lt;wwwun.org/Depts/dpa/repertorle/64-65-08.pdf&gt; (accessed
May 28, 2003).
84 See Repertorie Practice of the Security Council, id. at 124-25.
85 See S.C. Res. 244 at para. 5, UN Doc. S/RES/244, 22 Dec. 1968.
86 See S.C. Res. 353 at paras. 6 and 7 of the Preamble, UN Doc. S/RES/353, 20 July 1974.
87 See S.C. Res. 365, UN Doc. S/RES/365, 13 Dec. 1974.
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introduction of Turkish military forces, resulted in the Council recognizing the
need for an entirely new approach. The approach the Council opted for was re-
flected in a recently adopted unanimous resolution of the UN&apos;s General Assembly,
resolution 3212. Without specifying the details of resolution 3212, it essentially en-
visioned the negotiation of a completely new constitution between the two ethnic
communities on Cyprus. Security Council resolution 365 embraced this approach.
Paragraph 1 of that resolution expressly provided that the Council &quot;[e]ndorses
General Assembly resolution 3212 and urges the parties concerned to implement
it as soon as possible&quot;.88 Within weeks of resolution 365&apos;s adoption, Turkish-Cy-
priots declared separation from the Republic of Cyprus, thus leading the Security
Council to adopt resolution 367, reaffirming commitment to the new course and
condemning separatist inclinations.89 That same reaffirmation of commitment re-
peatedly appeared in subsequent resolutions in 197690, 197791, and 197892. Refer-
ences in any of the relevant resolutions to the earlier resolution 186 might be sug-
gested as indicating a continuation of the 1960 regime. Such suggestions, however,
seem thoroughly undercut by the fact the language of the resolutions as a whole
reflects nothing but Council approval of 186&apos;s establishment of UNFICYP and
other related matters.
From the preceding it is clear that, up until the 1974 Turkish occupation of the
northern portion of Cyprus, the resolutions of the Security Council viewed the
pre-existing 1960 legal regime as surviving evolving political developments on the
ground. With the commencement of belligerent occupancy, however, the Council
plainly recognized the need for change. Thus, the 1960 solution was no longer seen
as viable. The suggestion thus arising is that UN practice does not support the con-
tinuation of pre-existing international legal regimes following belligerent occupa-
tion. However, such an explanation, in the context of the Cyprus situation, emerges
from the Council&apos;s deliberate effort to cast the language of its resolutions so as to
reflect UN acceptance of a new political reality. With regard to Iraq, over the years
the UN fashioned an extensive and elaborate network of legal obligations applic-
able to Baghdad. And, unlike with its resolutions on Cyprus, the Security Council&apos;s
relevant Iraqi resolutions, when judged against the backdrop of resolution 1483,
appear to be intended to survive belligerent occupation.
Afghanistan. As for Afghanistan, the situation seems to have been more akin to
that involving Iraq than to the situation involving Cyprus. Essentially, the UN
sanctions imposed against Afghanistan&apos;s pre-occupation Tallban government came
under immediate Security Council review following the American military action
taken on the heels of al-Qaeda&apos;s September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States. The review, however, did not result in an immediate move to undo the
88 See id. at para. 1.
89 See S.C. Res. 367 at paras. 2, 4, and 5, UN Doc. S/RES/367, 12 Mar. 1975.
90 See S.C. Res. 391 at para. 2, UN Doc. S/RES/391, 15 June 1976.
91 See S.C. Res. 410 at para. 2, UN Doc. S/RES/410, 15 June 1977.
92 See S.C. Res. 440 at para. 1, UN Doc. S/RES/440, 27 Nov. 1978.
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Council&apos;s antedating sanctions regime. The implication flowing from this is that all
portions of the UN legal regime established prior to the U.S. military action against
Afghanistan were deliberately contemplated as surviving the belligerent occupation
that followed. In large measure, this appears to buttress the impression that
whether or not a UN legal regime survives de jure or de faao belligerent occupa-
tion turns more on the particular language of relevant Security Council resolutions
than on some universal, general rule applicable in each and every conceivable situa-
tion. Two observations merit reference, however, prior to detailing the Security
Council resolutions suggesting the aforementioned conclusion regarding the Af-
ghan situation. First, the fact the Security Council may have explicitly continued
the UN sanctions regime against Afghanistan, even after occupation by U.S. and
allied forces, may suggest nothing more than that UN regimes survive when cast in
language permitting such, but not when the Council opts for some alternative for-
mulation. Cyprus is a prime example of the latter case. And second, the situation in
Afghanistan saw the initial military action and occupation by the United States and
its allies overtaken by a UN approved international security assistance force
(ISAF) charged with stabilizing the countryside and aiding transition to a new gov-
erning structure. In such a context, the continued involvement of an antedating
UN legal regime is quite explicable.
The most relevant resolutions of the Council begin with resolution 1267 in late
1999.93 Though others had been adopted by the Council as early as October of
1996, immediately after the Taliban&apos;s emergence as the dominant political force in
the civil war that battered Afghans following the former Soviet Union&apos;s withdrawal
in 1989,94 those resolutions were restricted to condemning the Taliban for its treat-
ment of women, tolerance of terrorist groups and international drug trafficking, re-
ligious and ethnic persecution, and lack of respect for the country&apos;s cultural heri-
95
tage and treasures. With 1267 the Security Council initiated its sanctions regime
against Afghanistan. By paragraph 4 of the resolution, the Council indicated it in-
tended to institute a flight ban on Ariana Afghan Airlines, the airlines owned,
leased or operated by or on behalf of the Afghan government, and freeze funds
owned or controlled by the Taliban.96 The specifics of the resolution triggered
these sanctions once the Taliban refused to accede to the UN&apos;s demand that Osama
bin Laden, incriminated in attacks against U.S. embassies in east Africa, be handed
over to appropriate authorities for prosecution.97
December 2000 saw the Security Council&apos;s next instalment in the sanctions re-
gime against Afghanistan. Resolution 1333 demanded Taliban compliance with
93 See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267,15 Oct. 1999.
94 See Gilles D o r r o n s o r o, The World Isolates the Taliban: Afghanistan All Alone, Monde Dip-
lomatique (June 2001), available at &lt;wwwglobalpolicyorg/security/sanction/afghanistan/2001/0619ta-
li.htm&gt; (accessed June 5, 2003).
95 See generally S.C. Res. 1076, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1076, 22 Oct. 1996; S.C. Res. 1193, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1193, 28 Oct. 1998; S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214, 8 Dec. 1998.
96 See supra note 93 at para. 4.
97 See id. at paras. 2 and 3.
Za6RV 63 (2003) http://www.zaoerv.de
© 2003, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
Claims Regarding Transferable &quot;Legal Title&quot; to Iraqi Oil 625
1267.98 Paragraph 5 then both imposed an embargo on the supply of arms and re-
lated material to territory under Taliban control, and directed all states to prevent
the provision of technical assistance or training to the Taliban.99 Additionally, para-
graph 8 directed all states to close Taliban offices in their territory and freeze assets
of Osama bin Laden and individuals or entities associated with him.100 Paragraph
11 followed this by requiring all states deny any aircraft flight clearance if that air-
craft left from or landed in Afghan territory under Taliban control.&apos; 01 By the terms
of paragraph 23, the Security Council indicated its decision to continue the afore-
mentioned sanctions for one year, with possible renewal for additional Periods, de-
pendent upon Taliban compliance with Council demands.&apos; 02
Subsequent to resolutions 1267 and 1333, the Security Council adopted several
other resolutions regarding Afghanistan, a couple of which deserve passing refer-
ence. These include resolution 1373, adopted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the United States, and resolutions 1378 and 1386, both adopted in the
concluding two months of 2001. Resolution 1373 demanded that all states, though
not mentioning Afghanistan by name, cooperate in efforts to control international
terrorism.103 Resolution 1378, adopted after U.S. and allied military action to re-
move the Taliban from power, reaffirmed 1267 and 1333, and urged support for Af-
ghanistan&apos;s effort to transition to a more democratic and civil form of governing
structure.&apos; 04 To assist in facilitating the transition, and to provide international sup-
port to U.S. and allied military units, resolution 1386 both established and empow-
ered a UN international security assistance force (ISAF), consistent with the earlier
Bonn Agreement signed December 5, 2001, by the various factions vying for power
following the Taliban&apos;s ouster.&apos; 05
While the relevance of 1373, 1378, and 1386 is apparent, they add little to the
sanctions regime established by resolution 1267 and 1333. They do, however, set
the stage for two additional resolutions of substantial import in that respect: reso-
lutions 1388 and 1390. Both resolutions were adopted in mid-January 2002, many
weeks after the U.S. military had consolidated its position in Afghanistan and re-
moved the Taliban from power. With respect to 1388, paragraphs 1 and 2 made
clear the Security Council was not prepared to do more than lift the limitations.im-
posed by the sanctions regime on Ariana Afghan Airlines.106 As if to emphasize
the extremely restricted nature of the Council&apos;s willingness to relent on the pre-ex-
isting sanctions regime, the day after resolution 1388 was adopted, the Council re-
98 See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333, 19 Dec. 2000, at para. 1.
99 See id. at para. 5.
100 See id. at para. 8.
101 See id. at para. 11.
102 See id. at para. 23.
103 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373, 28 Sept. 2001.
104 See S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378, 14 Nov. 2001, first paragraph of Preamble and
para. I of su6stantive provisions.
105 See S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386, 20 Dec. 2001, paras. 1 and 3.
106 See S.C. Res. 1388, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1388, 15 Jan. 2002, paras. 1 and 2.
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iterated, in paragraph 1 of resolution 1390, that the other dimensions of the regime
continued to survive the foreign military occupation of Afghanistan.107 Paragraph
2 then imposed further financial and transit sanctions on the Tallban, and those as-
sociated with them.108 Interestingly, the U.S. apparently favored the action taken
by the UN both to continue and to expand the principal dimensions of the Afghan
sanctions regime.&apos; 09 With the subsequent adoption by the Security Council on Jan-
uary 17, 2003, of resolution 1455, the international community left no doubt of its
unequivocal intent to continue the sanctions regime for an additional year, despite
American and allied military forces remaining in Afghanistan.110
Any fair and impartial evaluation of the Afghanistan situation would have to ac-
knowledge that the UN sanctions regime with regard to that nation survived the
occupation by U.S. and coalition allies. Admittedly this occurred in the context of
eventual Security Council approval of an ISAF, thus giving at least tacit, after-the-
fact blessing to the American military action against the Taliban and its sympathi-
zers. It also occurred against a backdrop of U.S. support for continuation of the
Security Council&apos;s Afghan sanctions regime. Nonetheless, when looked at with the
Cyprus and Iraqi situations in mind, Afghanistan certainly suggests the UN knows
how to stress that its pre-existing legal regimes remain viable and in-place long
after foreign belligerent military occupation. From this, would it not seem safe to
conclude that, rather than state practice establishing some general rule providing
pre-existing regimes of international organizations survive or are destroyed by bel-
ligerent occupancy, their status is to be determined on a case-by-case basis? Would
it not seem reasonable to conclude that the only sure way to unravel the question
of whether the UN legal regime governing transfers of Iraqi oil remained intact
after U.S. and allied occupation of Iraq, is to search out the international commu-
nity&apos;s intent as reflected in the precise wording of Security Council resolutions
adopted before and after the relevant military action? And, as has been seen earlier,
would it be completely without merit to read those Council resolutions on Iraq as
envisioning the continuation of UN control over transferable title to Iraqi oil, even
after foreign military occupation of that country?
V. Conclusion
The relevant Security Council documents, general international rules concerning
the succession of states to international commitments, and state practice in situa-
tions comparable to that arising in Iraq, suggest there is reason to believe the UN
controlled the transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil in the immediate aftermath of
107 See S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390, 16 Jan. 2002, para. 1.
108 See id. at para. 2.
109 See Nicholas K r a I e v, US to Ask UN for Continuing Afghan Sanctions, Wash. Times (Jan. 8,
2002), available at &lt;wwwglobalpolicyorg/security/sanction/afgnstan/2002/0108update.htm&gt; (accessed
June 5, 2003).
110 See S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455, 17 Jan. 2003.
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the successful U.S.-led coalition military action against Baghdad. Both this conclu-
sion, and the informative light it casts on the broader question of the continuation
of UN juridical regimes following belligerent occupation, prove significant. How-
ever, forgoing an opportunity to either reiterate in summary form the reasons for
that conclusion, or explore in any detail the implications, for the broader question,
of the particular situation in Iraq, another seemingly more fundamental point bears
observation. Specifically, UN involvement in various aspects of managing the post-
war Iraqi situation cannot help but add to the sheer complexity and difficulty of
the tasks encountered. It clearly would be easier and cleaner were the United States
and its principal allies to be left in the position of making decisions about the full
range of matters from re-establishing Iraqi domestic stability to initiating the pro-
cess for creating future governing arrangements. Everything in between, such as Ir-
aqi oil sales, the use of proceeds therefrom, the honoring of preliminary and final
oil contracts entered into by the government of Saddam Hussein, could surely be
disposed of far more neatly were the number of nation-state decision-makers kept
to a minimum.
The recently adopted Security Council resolution 1483 does not opt for such a
streamlined and unilateralist course of action. And, as we have seen, there is plenty
of evidence to suggest that such a course of action was not operative, in connection
with transferability of title to Iraq&apos;s oil, prior to the adoption of that resolution. A
true conflict would have arisen between the UN&apos;s oil-for-food regime and the oc-
cupant&apos;s rights under the Hague regulations had the Security Council refused to
pass 1483. In such a case, would the occupying coalition, with its heavy burden of
restoring order and providing for the Iraqi citizenry, have been barred from sale of
Iraqi oil to meet occupation purposes? The essence of the UN&apos;s oil-for-food regime
suggests an affirmative answer, while the concept of necessity so implicit in the Ha-
gue and Geneva rules of war argues for the contrary. Assuming litigation regarding
transfers of title, would the U.S.-led coalition have been held to have committed
tortuous conversion had it acted to sell Iraqi oil to pay for relief efforts? In some
respects, resolution 1483 exposes the inadequacy of both the UN and the Hague
regimes, and the virtue of the existence of the United Nations. Clearly, the oil-for-
food regime had been compromised by Iraq&apos;s occupation. On the other hand, with-
out UN support, the difficulties of the coalition meeting its responsibilities as an
occupant were apparent. That the world&apos;s superpowers could invade without the
approval of the UN, but not occupy Iraq effectively without that organization&apos;s
assistance and tacit approval, is both an irony and an encouraging sign of the con-
tinuing relevance and authority of that body.
While many would prefer that it were otherwise, the international legal process
is not always efficient, rational, and linear. As with much that is the product of hu-
mankind&apos;s creative instinct, international law mutates, evolves, and progresses in a
halting, oft-times error-ridden fashion. Many decades may pass, and numerous
missteps may be taken, before the realization is apprehended that a more effective
or, perhaps, acceptable direction exists. Undoubtedly to the consternation of those
who confidently assert identification of the most straight-forward and appropriate
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way to secure the elimination of troublesome international legal issues, suggestions
are often voiced of a role for the United Nations. But the mere fact of having to
collaborate with others in that international forum to resolve difficulties facing the
community of nations can prove immensely frustrating and complicated. For
some, this provides adequate reason for minimizing the UN&apos;s role in addressing in-
ternational. problems, even though specific legal rules may require a particular in-
terpretation to accomplish that objective. For others, however, this simply high-
lights the fact that the international legal process has the capacity to promote inter-
ests and considerations far beyond those immediately linked to the resolution of
specific international problems. Legal issues, and the methods by which they come
to be handled, offer not only opportunities to resolve current, pressing difficulties,
but to assure that longer-term interests - interests with no necessary connection to
a problem at-hand - are open for treatment as well.
Admittedly, from the standpoint of the United States, questions regarding con-
trol over transferable &quot;legal title&quot; to Iraqi oil, before as well as after resolution
1483, might have been settled in a cleaner and crisper fashion through exclusive ap-
plication of the relevant Hague rules on belligerent occupancy. Introducing the no-
tion that the UN legal regime antedating Gulf War 11 survived the ouster of Sad-
dam Hussein and governed subsequent dispositions of such oil provides an unwel-
comed and potentially exasperating inconvenience. However, at the same time, it
could well be that that notion serves multiple long-term interests. Most obviously,
it facilitates re-engagement between the United States and historic allies who ex-
pressed reservations on Iraq serious enough to frustrate efforts to get a Security
Council resolution authorizing the overall military operation. The importance of
that interest seems recognized in the very fact the U.S. actively took the lead in
drafting resolution 1483, and there is every reason to believe that same interest
would have been served by acknowledgement of UN control over transferable title
even prior to such resolution&apos;s adoption. Further, there is the long-term interest of
addressing international problems through collective, rather than unilateral or ser-
iously limited multilateral action. Collective action gives voice to the full range of
options available. Through the radically diverse perspectives that thereby emerge,
chances are minimized that a legitimate angle on a solution will be ignored or
pushed to the margins. Positions have to be explained and justified. There is also an
increased likelihood that countries consulted in a collective process will feel as
though they have a greater stake in helping to solve problems confronting the inter-
national community. Inclusion in a participatory process has the effect of neutraliz-
ing one&apos;s inclination to deny that a problem once perceived no longer exists. And,
without putting too fine a line on it, collective action has the further advantage of
assuring that the costs associated with particular solutions are distributed among
all nations, and not borne by a small handful who have acted outside the approval
of the international community.
Apart from these long-term interests in being engaged internationally and acting
through collective rather than unilateral mechanisms, two other relevant interests
served by involvement of the United Nations in the Iraqi situation deserve men-
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tion. Specifically, there is the long-term interest in a rule-based system of interna-
tional relations. Rule-based systems are not immune from various deficiencies. To
the extent they approve action only when certain clear standards have been met,
they provide frequent opportunity for situations of insufficient evidence to result
in complete paralysis. Nonetheless, rule-based systems prevent degeneration into
complete arbitrariness and power politics, and they engender a feeling of fair treat-
ment and even-handedness that can ass in reducing international confrontation.
Perhaps less obvious, but no less significant in the context of the question of con-
trol over transferability of Iraqi oil, is the somewhat shorter-term interest in pro-
viding international legitimacy to subsequent transactions concerning that oil.
Clearly, by involving the UN, the chances are minimized that legal claims against
such oil are likely to be judged meritorious. Having established a role for the Uni-
ted Nations in dispositions of Iraq&apos;s oil wealth, member states would not be an-
xious to permit the use of their own courts to inject legal confusion. International
legitimacy provides transactional certainty. And transactional certainty is
indispensable to the quick generation of revenues for the rehabilitation of Iraqs
war-torn infrastructure.
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